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the theological framework that informs these five versions is clearly
evident, it can also be said that each of the five may legitimately claim
to have a basis in Jesus himself. The reason that there are five versions
is that the NT authors see Jesus' activity as Divine Man as representing his mission to be related in varying degrees to his essence as the
Christ.
James M. Robinson reviews the history of the exegesis of the parables of the kingdom since Juelicher from a methodological point of
view. He shows how the New Hermeneutic approaches the parables
allowing the parabolic form to function meaningfully, rather than
folIowing the previous exegetical methodologies that considered form
as irrelevant to content. A parable is not a coded presentation of an
abstract truth, nor an abstract .understanding of existence. The New
Hermeneutic gives a material role to language since it itself actualizes
God's reign. On this basis the parables are conceived as "a language
event potentialTy admitting the hearer of God's grace." The locus of
God's reign is the language of Jesus, which presents the possibilities
from which reality is actualized. In the parables reality comes into
language. In this way form and content are interwoven.
The two essays in this collection which merit special attention are
the first and the last, the former for the originality of its conception,
and the latter for Robinson a t his expository best, even if this reviewer
could not decide what it means to say that a parable names its true
being.
Saint Mary's College
Notre Dame, Indiana
Young, Norman J. History and Existential Theology: The Role of
History i n the Thought of RudoEf Bultmann. Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1969. 174 pp. $ 5.95.

While admitting that the post-Bultmannian era has already begun,
Norman Young, Professor of Systematic Theology, Queens College,
University of Melbourne, seeks valiantly through this book to bring
Bultmann back into the mainstream of theological thought. Most
readers will conclude that his efforts have been in vain, since new
issues have arisen and the locus of attention has shifted to focus
on man in all his social dimensions. The book is somewhat quixotic
and belated in making its appearance. I t is about ten years too late.
The dates of the material cited in the footnotes attest to this.
Nevertheless, for a student of the new generation who needs to make
acquaintance with the history of theology, this book will serve as
an excellent introduction to Bultmann's theology. The author writes
with clarity and exposes the significant strands of BuItmann's thought.
He treats his subject in three parts: I, Bultmann's View of History;
11, History and Theological Method; 111, History and Doctrine.
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Under I, he deals with Bultmann's distinction between nature and
history and historisch and geschichtlich. Then he deals with Bultmann's
concept of Geschichtlichkeit and eschatological existence. Under 11,
he discusses Bultmann's method in dealing with hermeneutics and
demythologization, relating these to the understanding of history
explained in I. In 111, he explains Bultmann's concept of revelation,
of the eschatological event of Christ, and of man's existence.
Throughout the discussion Young, while critical, seeks to work
within Bultmann's system. He seems to think that his work is a
a corrective rather than a repudiation of Bultmann. Therefore, he
defends Bultmann against what he considers unjust criticism, but,
on the other hand, criticizes him for not allowing his method to go
far enough. He agrees with Bultmann's hermeneutical method i n
principle but not with what i n fact occurs in the application of this
method. He illustrates this with Bultmann's use of John and Paul as
norm and the neglect of other parts of the NT, or with his acceptance
of certain ideas of John and Paul to the rejection of other ideas in
these same writers. He admits that there is no distorted exegesis
but the result is only partial exegesis. He would, therefore, seek a
more adequate approach which would encympass the entire NT.
He finds this approach basically in Bultmann's principles. "If the
most basic of his hermeneutical principles is applied, viz., that the
interpreter should brim to the text the question that concerned the
author, this would mean admitting that the question of human existence appropriate in most cases is not appropriate in others, and that
the history which interests some of the writers is not the historicity
of man but, for instance, the history of the nation. I t would also
open the way to finding another series of questions that would elucidate
these passages. Such an approach is not, I think, fundamentally
out of harmony with Bultmann's project; it recognizes the diversity
of New Testament witness and allows the Word to address man
through this diversity" (p. 153).
Young's second major criticism is directed toward Bultmann's view
of revelation. While defending Bultmann against Ogden's charge
of inconsistency in maintaining the unique act of God in Christ, he
is not satisfied with the separation of the Jesus of history from the
Christ of faith, the lack of content in the revelation of God, and the
tendency to locate God's act in preaching and not to acknowledge
that the event began with Jesus himself. Nevertheless, he feels that
it is still possible to remain within the Bultmannian system without
the weakness cited above. To show that this is possible he refers to
the work of the new questers who, with the same view of history as
Bultmann, seek to bridge the gap between the Christ of faith and
the Jesus of history and in doing this provide some content, however
minimal, to the revelation of God. His own "constructive alternative"
follows the lead of Gogarten who insists "that the act of God originates
not in the kerygma about Jesus, nor in the 'nature' of Jesus as a
past-historical personality, but in the proclamation of Jesus himself"
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(p. 126). In this way, the historical Jesus becomes of primary significance, for it is in him that God proclaims his word. Thus while "Jesus
becomes the eschatological event in the church's proclamation,"
"this is true only because first he became the eschatological event
by his own obedient hearing, proclaiming, and living of the word
given to him by God" (p. 126).
These criticisms of Bultmann are not new, but the author's claim
of providing these dternatives within Bultmann's system is, I t is
possible for him to do so with his first alternative of "complete exegesis" only because he resorts to "the most basic of his hermeneutical
principles, viz., that the interpreter should bring to the text the question that concerned the author" (p. 153). For Young this wouId mean
that there would be legitimate concerns other than the question of
human existence, but for Bultmann, approaching the Bible with
Heidegger's analysis of man, other concerns would be irrelevant and
peripheral and would distort the Scripture's main concern and thrust.
To Young's attempt to work with Bultmann's system, the latter
would surely say, "Nein !"
To the second alternative Bultmann would also say, "Nein!" but
his voice would be muffled somewhat by the fact that his students have
attempted to work in the same direction. There is, therefore, some
justification for Young's claim that this alternative is workable
within Bultrnann's system. However, in this and in the work of the
new questers there seems to be an inexplicable reticence to show that
Jesus understood himself to be the Messiah, for fear that this would
remove the scandal or objectify faith. Even if historical criticism
should prove the claim, it hardly seems that this would remove the
scandal or objectify faith. Bultrnann especially thinks this would
be faith with works, a kind of legalism. I t has been proved by historical
criticism that many throughout history have claimed divine status,
but this does not in itself compel faith. Whether it can in fact be
proved that Jesus understood himself to be the Messiah is for historical
criticism to determine, but there should be no reticence in declaring
that he understood himself a s such for fear that faith would be compelled and objectified. Nevertheless, the question needs to be asked,
"Is it possible to follow Young's alternative here, not because Buttmann's method disallows it, but only becmse Bultmann himself
does so ? Is the fault with Bultmann's method or with Bultmann 7"
Young thinks it is the latter.
One question kept arising throughout the reading of the book,
"Why does Young feel he needs to wear Bultmann's armor?" To
approach his two major positions, he could have started out just as
well with another method. I t would have been much simpler.
Andrews University
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